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Executive Summary 
 
Aims and Objectives 
The research aimed to: 
1. Examine perspectives of Operation Alloy from involved staff, namely: 
a. Assigned police officers; 
b. Mental health staff; and 
c. Control room staff. 
2. Assess operational performance and effectiveness in terms of: 
a. Reported incidents triaged in control room; 
b. Operational advice provided to frontline response officers; 
c. Deployment of Triage Response Vehicle. 
3. Determine the positives and negatives in terms of: 
a. Partnership working; 
b. Decision-making; 
i. On-the-ground; 
ii. In the control room. 
 
 
Method 
To meet the aims and objectives, a mixed methods approach was taken. Semi-structured interviews were 
completed with 15 professionals involved in Operation Alloy (5 Force Control Room staff; 5 Police Officers; 
and 5 Mental Health staff) and analysis of police data records detailing recorded activities and incidents during 
2 one-week time periods. Qualitative data were thematically analysed. 
 
Findings & Recommendations 
Value and Outcomes: 
The findings demonstrate the operation was viewed positively, particularly by control room staff and mental 
health professionals. The operation was indicated to be worthwhile and valuable. Participants frequently 
emphasised the importance of the operation, in delivering a better quality service to people in need rather 
than simply freeing up resources. The combination of police and mental health professionals within the 
operation was viewed as being complementary, opening new disposals to enable positive incident outcomes. 
Whilst being an important feature of the operation, the reported value of the operation was not necessarily 
enabled through deployment, but through the sharing of information informing the professional judgements 
of both police and mental health staff. The operation resulted in people being dealt with using more 
appropriate care pathways, by conducting a holistic assessment of an individual’s needs. 
 
Behaviour and Practices: 
A very positive benefit in terms of behaviours of staff involved in the operation was an articulated mutual 
respect for each other’s professional judgement. Mental health staff felt that their contribution was valued 
and respected by the police; police felt consequently relieved and reassured by working with mental health 
professionals. It was suggested that consistent staffing enabled stronger relationships to be formed and having 
better outcomes for individuals in need. Police officers articulated respectfully how competent mental health 
staff were when communicating with individuals involved in incidents, striking a balance between empathy 
and assertiveness in resolving incidents. It was recognised how the approach adopted by police officers, 
informed by their identity and skills, was different to that of mental health professionals. The implicit messages 
and meanings of uniform and persona were found to be important. The florescent jackets and stab vests worn 
by police officer were viewed as both presenting a physical barrier and heightening anxiety within situations.  
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Management:  
The aims and expectations of the operation were suggested to have evolved over time. While reducing s136 
detentions was identified as being the original aim, other aims may be held by individuals and the respective 
organisations in relation to service quality, longer term resolution of incidents, and reduction of ‘regular 
callers’. Broader guidelines and principles were suggested to be welcomed by all parties to guide practice 
during shifts on the operation. In particular, better communication about the operation to frontline officers 
would support how the operation is perceived and valued within IRTs. It was strongly indicated that more 
consistent staffing arrangements would be welcomed as it was recognised that staffing of the operation was 
irregular - from both police and mental health perspectives. The mechanisms to identify measurable impact 
were suggested to be inefficient and tiring. The extent to which the operation was able to demonstrate 
measurable impact based on its reporting procedures was limited, having implications for engaging response 
officers, and also informing perspectives within the wider organisations.  
 
 
The following points identify key findings and recommendations. 
 
1. The operation was suggested to have evolved over time, with individual staff holding different 
understandings of their operational expectations and perceived value. 
R1. The operation has a refresh, with all objectives as well as the purpose/identity of the 
operation being explicitly communicated to all parties. 
 
2. Data recording for the purpose of adequately capturing the activities of the operation held by the police 
was found to be inaccurate, thus not allowing a comprehensive evidencing of actions, value or outcomes. 
R2. Data recording procedures be reviewed and streamlined. As part of this, clear expectations 
and accountabilities for all parties in terms of documentation are formulated. 
 
3. Irregular staffing arrangements were suggested to contribute to inconsistencies identified during the 
completion of this project, being consequential to perceptions held by different individuals, and potentially 
resulting in inconsistent levels of service delivery to people in need. 
R3. A dedicated and bespoke team is assigned regularly to the operation, with the respective 
composition of such a team being re-considered, and different roles potentially introduced (e.g. 
PCSOs, specials, paramedics etc.). 
 
4. The evidence shows inconsistencies between staff in terms of activities completed during shifts, and the 
thresholds or factors involved in deployment decision-making. 
R4. The staff involved in the operation are afforded opportunities to share knowledge and good 
practice, enabling more consistent responses to, and resolution of, emergent incidents. Such 
learning opportunities should be monitored and appropriate amendments to governance and 
practice documentation made.  
 
5. The progress and achievements of the operation were found to have not been captured or meaningfully 
recognised. 
R5. A quarterly partnership management meeting is held to review progress, in relation to agreed 
objectives (R1). 
 
R6. A communication strategy is developed to disseminate operational effectiveness both in terms 
of inward value (resource vs. outcome, frequency of s136 reduction/avoidance) and outward 
value (longer term resolution for the individual in need).  
 
R7. Appropriate succession planning is undertaken to ensure practices and management of 
operation is not held by any one individual, and is transferred when individuals move into 
different postings.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Operation Alloy is an initiative involving a partnership between police officers and mental health professionals 
to deliver street triage services direct to people experiencing mental health distress.  The rationale for this is 
to ensure a timely response for better outcomes to service users, and enhance inter-agency working to ensure 
individuals were directed to the most appropriate services relative to their need.  This reports provides a 
review of the operation which has been achieved through (i) a literature review, (ii) statistical analysis of police 
records and (iii) semi-structured interviews with control room staff, police officers, and mental health 
professionals.  
 
This chapter sets out key observations drawn from a literature review, in order to contextualise the findings 
of this research with the current evidence base.  
 
1.1 Current Context  
Estimates vary as to the proportion of police time taken up by incidents related to mental health: between 2 
percent to 20 - 40 percent (Independent Commission on Mental Health and Policing, 2013: 12). Whilst the 
proportion of time spent may differ across the county, there appears to be consistency in the nature of 
reported issues where public sector agencies seek to respond to and resolve mental health incidents. Notable 
gaps in provision have been highlighted to include:  
 
 Limited access to services at night, with police becoming de facto first response to mental health 
issues. Notably, this has been recognised as a long-standing issue (see Fahy, 1989)  
 Provision of ‘places of safety’ lacking across the country, with police cells being used to plug shortfall. 
If there is no significant reduction in use of police cells as place of safety, then HMIC may recommend 
that they be removed as a place of safety in the Mental Health Act 1983 (House of Commons, 2015: 
11).    
 Poor awareness of mental health conditions in policing, with staff lacking training, skills, and 
confidence to deal with such incidents (Adebowale, 2013: 7).     
 Disproportionate use of police force and restraint to resolve incidents (Adebowale 2013: 7; House of 
Commons, 2015).    
 
Whilst recent reviews have been critical of how the police resolve mental health incidents in this ‘de facto’ 
position, it is recognised that surrounding provision of out-of-hours support for mental health is also poor. As 
Lord Adebowale’s report states:  
 
‘Given that police officers and staff are often the gateway to appropriate care – whether of a criminal 
justice or healthcare nature – it is essential that people with mental ill health or learning disabilities 
are recognised and assisted by officers from the very first point of contact. The police, however, cannot 
and indeed are not expected to deal with vulnerable groups on their own’.  
Independent Commission on Mental Health and Policing, 2013: 6 
 
In light of this, the current Home Secretary, Theresa May, has affirmed a national roll-out of initiatives which 
seek to bring together the operational resources of police and mental health professionals, in order to improve 
outcomes for vulnerable people. One example of such a scheme has been the development of mental health 
‘Street Triage’ schemes – as shall be discussed below.   
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1.2 Street Triage Schemes 
Street Triage schemes currently operate in a number of police forces across England and Wales.1 The main 
rationale of such schemes appears to be to reduce the number of s136 detentions under the Mental Health 
Act, and ensure more appropriate outcomes for individuals. The delivery and organisation schemes varies 
across forces in England. Many are funded through ‘local innovation’ funds, whilst others by the Department 
of Health, Police and Crime Commissioners, Local Authorities, and Clinical Commissioning Groups (NHS, 2015: 
para. 24).  
 
Little has been done to evaluate such schemes with due consideration for the potential influence variations in 
operating models may affect outcomes (House of Commons, 2015). That said, a key finding from published 
appraisals appears to be a reduction in the number of detentions under s136 Mental Health Act, albeit with 
variations across police forces. Through staff working together on scene, it is reported that such schemes have 
helped to build positive relationships between police and NHS staff, and break down barriers between 
participating agencies (House of Commons, 2015: 19). The collaborative approach has further been said to 
improve information sharing – sourced from both police and NHS records - ensuring frontline staff better 
contextualise incidents with information about an individual’s previous contact with police, clinical histories, 
medications, and provision of current care plans (House of Commons, 2015: 19). As an example, one (internal) 
evaluation of street triage in Oxfordshire identified that 74% of those referred to the triage team were already 
known to mental health services; resultantly, mental health professionals were able to provide ‘invaluable 
information’ to officers on scene, in order to better inform officer risk assessments (Thames Valley Police, 
2015: 7, 39).    
 
NHS evidence submitted to the House of Commons also identifies provision of mental health staff on scene 
helps police officers to ‘identify specific vulnerabilities’. This was said to cover a range of mental health 
conditions, but also for specific developmental disabilities: for example, certain diagnosable mental health 
conditions, such as autism, may be misinterpreted as aggressive by those who are not trained to diagnose 
such conditions (NHS England, 2015: para 19). NHS staff were further able to provide advice on appropriate 
interventions and diversionary services (NHS England, 2015).  
 
Whilst little has been documented about client perspectives, initial findings are further positive. An 
independent evaluation in Essex conducted interviews with a cohort of street triage service users and their 
families. They found users to have overwhelmingly positive experiences, with more appropriate treatment 
outcomes, and lower use of restraint in resolving their cases (Scott, 2016).   
 
The following two case studies provide details of alternative models adopted in different force areas. They 
illustrate similarities yet highlight developed distinctions to the model adopted in Northamptonshire.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 Street Triage pilots are said to have been established in 25 out of 40 Police forces in England.  
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Case Study: Thames Valley Police and Oxfordshire Health NHS Trust2  
 Mental health street triage piloted 7 nights a week, between 18:00 – 02:00 hours.    
 Scheme sought to bring together Mental Health Professionals (MHP) with TVP officers (triage team) 
to provide guidance and advice to assist police with decision making and risk management at such 
incidents 
 Two models of deployment trialled:  
                  (i) MHP crewed with a police officers with ability to be deployed by the police control room;  
                  (ii) MHP unaccompanied and be deployed to incidents where police were already in attendance 
 Funded for one year with £200,000.  
Key Findings: 
 Operational model 1 mostly favoured by staff involved, for it allowed better joint decision making 
from different information systems, and increased provision for shared learning between MHP and 
police officers (Thames Valley Police, 2015: 22).  
 Deployments of the triage team to incidents dropped over the course of the pilot, from around 
35% of incidents at the start to 20% during the concluding months (Thames Valley Police, 2015: 7); 
face to face triage therefore declined steadily over the 12 month period (Thames Valley Police, 
2015: 26). 
 Numbers of those detained under s136 reduced by nearly 40% (Thames Valley Police, 2015: 7). In 
fact, it was outlined that but for the street triage scheme being in place, officers would have used 
s136 powers on 66 occasions (Thames Valley Police, 2015: 7).3  
 
 
Case Study: South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust – from street triage to 24/7 support line.  
 Mental health street triage was trialled with both face to face deployments of healthcare 
professionals alongside telephone support. 
 Initial internal NHS evaluation found little evidence to support mainstream funding to continue 
street triage.  
 Advice line was however found to have become ‘embedded in police practice’.  
 As such, new ‘24/7 support line’ introduced in December 2015.  
o Operated by qualified and experienced mental health professionals. 
o Broader function than police support, with two numbers: (i) public number in care crisis 
leaflets, for those experiencing distress and concern about their own mental health; and (ii) 
an exclusive line to front-line NHS (A&E, London Ambulance Service) and Police.   
o Initial results highlight telephone line serves as a ‘valid referral into services’ and more 
appropriate disposals.   
 
 
 
  
                                                        
2 Information here is sourced from an internal evaluation. Whilst findings are illustrative of experiences similar to those 
identified in Northamptonshire, the methodologies through which such findings are drawn is not fully clear.  
3 This was identified by police officers who stated that but for the triage service they would have used s136 powers; 
again, the method through which this was discerned is not however clear.   
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2. Aims and Objectives 
 
This report aims to:  
 
1. Examine perspectives of Operation Alloy from involved staff, namely: 
a. Assigned police officers; 
b. Mental health staff; and 
c. Control room staff. 
2. Assess operational performance and effectiveness in terms of: 
a. Reported incidents triaged in control room; 
b. Operational advice provided to frontline response officers; 
c. Deployment of Triage Response Vehicle. 
3. Determine the positives and negatives in terms of: 
a. Partnership working; 
b. Decision-making; 
i. On-the-ground; 
ii. In the control room. 
3. Methods 
 
This section provides an overview of method (3.1) and the approach to the analysis (3.2).  
 
3.1 Method 
 
To meet the aims and objectives, a mixed methods approach was taken. Semi-structured interviews were 
completed with 15 professionals involved in Operation Alloy (5 Force Control Room staff; 5 Police Officers; 
and 5 Mental Health staff) and analysis of police records detailing recorded activities and incidents during 2 
one-week times periods. Interviews lasted around 30 minutes and were digitally recorded and transcribed to 
enable a rich, credible and dependable interpretation of the data. Ethical approval for the study was obtained 
from the School of Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee at the University of Northampton. Participants 
were provided information sheets and were required to sign an informed consent sheet.  
 
3.2 Analysis 
 
Qualitative data were thematically analysed involving six steps, based on Braun and Clarke’s (2006) thematic 
framework: ‘familiarisation’ through reading and re-reading transcripts, ‘code generation’, ‘theme 
identification’, ‘review’ of themes and codes, ‘labelling themes’ and ‘report writing’.  
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4. Findings 
 
This chapter is organised into 2 sections. First the results and analysis of statistical data are presented and 
second the findings from semi-structured interviews are detailed.   
 
4.1 Statistical Data 
 
Data presented in this section derives from two key data sources held by Northamptonshire police: (i) from 
Northamptonshire Police Control Room, and (ii) from mental health data held by Northamptonshire Police. 
For the sake of clarity, control room data is referred to as ‘Police’ in the graphs given below. Whilst both 
sources of data are held by Northamptonshire Police, the latter data set mirrors that which is compiled by 
mental health practitioners; in essence, this second data source therefore represents that which is held by 
Northamptonshire Healthcare NHS Trust.     
Data were requested from two predetermined time points in order to better understand what is currently 
recorded, and to give a general indication of how the operation is resourced over a typical week.  
Time points are referred to as ‘T1’ and ‘T2’, and are defined as follows:  
 T1: Between 01/02/16 and 07/02/16 (7 days) 
 T2: Between 07/03/16 and 13/03/16 (7days)      
 
Mental health data shall also be considered of itself, given that a wider range of information is currently 
provided in this data source. From the outset, it is important to note that this section of the report does not 
offer a representative picture of the scope, scale, and nature of incidents involving Operational Alloy; rather, 
it serves to present a snapshot of what data are currently available and recorded.  
 
4.1.1 Comparison between Mental Health and Police Data  
 
Key findings are presented as a comparison in order to highlight the disparities between the two sources. It 
has been suggested that control room data may not be fully accurate, owing to the different ways through 
which an incident record can be ‘flagged’ or ‘updated’ to reflect that it has been referred to Operation Alloy. 
Resultantly, incidents in which Operational Alloy has been involved may not always have been ‘flagged’, and 
so captured, in the control room data. The suggested assumption is therefore that mental health data may 
identify a greater number of incidents. Comparisons have, however, revealed that this is not the case: 
generally, there are fewer incidents identified in the mental health data in comparison to control room data – 
thus at odd with the explanations of disparities outlined above.  
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Figure 1: Number of incidents flagged as being relevant to Operational Alloy in weeks T1 and T2 in both 
Police and Mental Health data sources.  
 
Figure 1 above highlights a consistent disparity between police data and mental health data. In both T1 and 
T2, police data identified more flagged incidents as being relevant to Operation Alloy in comparison to mental 
health records. Based on the records received, it was not possible to identify why such a disparity exists. 
4.1.2 Mental Health Data  
 
This section provides a snapshot of data held by Northamptonshire police which derives from records 
compiled by mental health staff. This data will be considered distinctly, owing to the fact that more 
comprehensive information was recorded.    
Quick Reference Tables: 
T1 
 01/02/16 
Mon 
02/02/16 
Tue 
03/02/16 
Wed 
04/02/16 
Thu 
05/02/16 
Fri 
06/02/16 
Sat 
07/02/16 
Sun 
No of incidents  0 0 0 2 2 3 1 
Total time dealing 
with incidents 
(mins) 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
30 
 
170 
 
125 
 
15 
Staffed:        Police? ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
NHS?  ✓ ✕ ✕ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Car deployed?  N/A N/A N/A ✕ ✓ ✓ ✕ 
s136 Detention? N/A N/A N/A ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ 
 
In T1, Operation Alloy was not live on Tuesday 2nd and Wednesday 3rd February 2016. This was due to staffing 
issues, with no community psychiatric nurse (CPN) available for the shift. The table above shows that the 
vehicle was deployed on 2 of the days within T1; a little over 5 and a half hours was spent in time on dedicated 
incidents; and no s136 detentions were completed within the bounds of the operation.  
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In T2, no data were provided for Monday 7th, Saturday 12th and Sunday 13th March 2016; it is not possible to 
determine why this is the case without interrogation at source.  The table above shows how the vehicle was 
deployed on 2 of the days within T2; a little under 7 hours was spent in time on dedicated incidents; and no 
s136 detentions were completed within the bounds of the operation.  
The tables above highlights a range of inconsistencies in data recording. While many cells were left blank, 
other members of the mental health team completed the cells in accordance with instructions given. This 
therefore means it is difficult to conclude that blank cells mean ‘NO’, given that they are inconsistently 
completed.   
This was pervasive in the following cases: 
 Data flagging a repeat caller or ‘Known to Mental Health services’ was often left blank;  
 ‘Contact criteria’ was inconsistently completed (‘MH in public place’ and ‘MH at home’ were often 
left blank);  
 There does not appear to have been any s136 detentions in both T1 and T2. This was however 
inferred from cells being blank, rather than completed to say ‘No’;     
 One incident was recorded without basic time and date information; 
 In T1, no postcode information was recorded for 3 incidents.    
 
Maps illustrating car deployments across Northamptonshire  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T2 
 07/03/16 
Mon 
08/03/16 
Tue 
09/03/16 
Wed 
10/03/16 
Thu 
11/03/16 
Fri 
12/03/16 
Sat 
13/03/16 
Sun 
No of incidents  0 3 2 3 3 0 0 
Total time dealing 
with incidents 
(mins) 
 
0 
 
140 
 
40 
 
? 
 
235 
 
0 
 
0 
Staffed:        Police? ? ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ? ? 
NHS?  ? ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ? ? 
Car deployed?  N/A ✓ ✕ ✕ ✓ N/A N/A 
s136 Detention?  N/A ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ N/A N/A 
1 
2 
1 
1
1 
Car Deployments T1  Car Deployments T2  
1 
Triage car base  
 No of cars deployed to county area  
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Figure 2: General health / diagnoses of flagged Operation Alloy incidents across both T1 and T2.     
 
For a large proportion of incidents general health diagnoses were unknown. It is difficult to determine if this 
is because individuals were not known to mental health services, and as such cells were left blank. 
Nevertheless, Figure 2 shows how, even from a two-week snapshot, the diversity of mental health conditions 
linked to the Operation. 
 
Figure 3: Number of incidents flagged as Operational Alloy where tactical information had been shared 
across both T1 and T2.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is clear to see that in the majority of flagged incidents tactical information was shared. This shows how the 
sharing of information within the control room setting was more frequent than deployment, a point which is 
expanded upon in Section 4.2 where findings drawn from interviews with staff are presented. Moreover, the 
everyday language which is used to refer to the scheme (‘the mental health car’) overemphasises ‘deployment’ 
as the central aspect and purpose of the Operation, with more tactical exchanges of information being evident 
to inform the management of risk on the ground.  
9
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Figure 4: Number of referrals made by pathway across both T1 and T2.   
Across both T1 and T2, both general practitioner (GP) and police referrals are the most common outcomes 
identified. Incidents referred to the police appear to arise when CPN on shift provides information to officers 
on scene, and officers then continue to resolve the incident. A range of other disposals were also identified, 
including referrals to Primary Care Liaison Services and Community Mental Health Teams (a specialist mental 
health NHS service), and more immediate responses such as accident and emergency, and ambulance services. 
The data further demonstrate the added value of the Operation by enabling easier access to a wider range of 
disposals.  
 
Figure 5: Number of incidents where an assessment was conducted by a Community Psychiatric Nurse 
across both T1 and T2.   
 
Figure 5 shows that there were 6 formal assessments completed (1 telephone) by a Community Psychiatric 
Nurse as part of the Operation. This meant, however, there were 13 incidents which were not formally 
assessed across T1 and T2. The data provided did not specify reasons as to why an assessment was not 
conducted. 
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4.1.3 Police Data 
 
This section provides a snapshot of data held by Northamptonshire police which derives from records 
compiled by control room staff.  
 
Figure 6: Number of incidents flagged as being relevant to Operation Alloy in T1 and T2 by incident type.   
 
Figure 6 shows that the most frequently logged incident type was ‘Public safety and welfare’, though the 
category does not allow further breakdown of information as to the nature of incident. A key point to make 
here is that the frequency of incident does not necessarily translate to the time/resource investment in 
resolving respective incident types. For instance, the qualitative data presented in Section 4.2 highlighted an 
emphasis within the control room staff upon nuisance callers and missing persons, where it was suggested a 
high amount of resource was spent.  
 
4.2 Qualitative Data 
 
This section presents analysis and supporting evidence from the semi-structured interviews completed with 
1. Control Room staff; 2. Police Officers and 3. Mental Health Professionals. Owing to the small number of 
individuals who took part in the project, references will be attributed to one of the respective groups, in 
accordance with good ethical practice.  
The section will be organised into 3 overlapping sections: 1. Value and Outcomes; 2. Behaviours and 
Practices and 3. Management.  
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4.2.1 Value and Outcomes 
 
Most staff reported that the operation was worthwhile and valuable, having a beneficial effect in terms of 
outcomes for people in need as well as organisational efficiency. The operation was viewed more positively 
by control room and mental health staff, with police officers interviewed having mixed opinions. The closer 
working arrangements enabled by the operation was viewed as reducing s136 disposals and reducing the cost 
and resource implications for police and health services.   
 
“…it saves time, money, resource further down the line so for that little bit of pain in the frontline, you 
end up saving in a multitude of variants further down” (Control Room) 
 
“I think a lot of it is about partnership working, about actually working closely with the police.  And 
also just having that extra resource there as a way of minimising, or trying to minimise the amount of 
people that end up on 136s either up in custody or, you know, down in the hospitals” (Mental Health) 
 
While mental health staff felt that the operation had reduced the frequency of s136 detentions, evidence of 
this reduction could not be explored in the data provided; this is however identified as a key performance 
measure in the Operation Alloy ‘Terms of Reference’. Nevertheless, the ‘original’ aim of preventing the use of 
s136 was identified as being an important factor shaping the decision-making of nurses in terms of 
deployment.  
 
“We know that the comparable timeframe between 2014, six till midnight and 2013, six till midnight, 
we reduced 136s by 41%.” (Mental Health) 
 
“It’s been very effective at picking people up who aren’t known to services, and making sure that they 
get followed through, and they get the right help” (Mental Health)   
 
“I think you’re basing a lot of it on the judgement of the police officers that are there and how they’re 
sort of viewing the situation.  And if they’re sort of getting to that point where it’s like, “Yeah, we think 
this person needs to come in and we’re gonna put them on a 136, then yeah, that would be a good 
time (to deploy)…” (Mental Health) 
 
Participants frequently emphasised the importance of the operation delivering a better quality service to 
people in need rather than simply freeing up resources. This was said to have been better achieved through 
providing a speedier response to mental health need, positioning professionals with right skills, at the right 
times, in the right places. The combination of police and mental health professionals within the operation was 
viewed as being complementary and as opening a wider range of disposals to enable positive incident 
outcomes.  
 
“I think the ultimate aim is the outcomes I think we get are for the individual, ‘cause it’s not about the 
policing saving money ultimately or the NHS saving money, it’s about having an outcome for that 
individual, they’ve called because they want help.” (Control Room) 
 
“And for me that’s what Op. Alloy is about, giving them the service they need there and then” (Control 
Room) 
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“I think the… the police and mental health nurse, they do work completely differently.  But I actually 
think that they work quite well together. They inform each other quite nicely. Especially if you’re out 
on situations, so you can only get so far mental health wise, and you’re like, ‘Right OK, I’ve tried this, 
tried this, tried this’. And you can actually have that discussion with the officer and then… so that’s 
what I mean, it’s a very joint venture, really” (Mental Health)   
 
The operation allowed quick access to a wide range of information, with mental health staff being able to 
access and share information from NHS systems (e.g. System 1). The provision of non-incident specific 
information provided to the police on mental health conditions by mental health staff was also identified as 
being valuable, and was seen as informing the related dynamics of risk (e.g. the meanings and implications of 
specific mental disorders within the context of an incident). The facilitation of a wider range of disposals to 
emergent incidents was a critical and extremely positive benefit of the operation.  
 
“…the initial aim is to try and reduce the amount of Section 136s that are used unnecessarily.  Because 
obviously the police don’t always feel that they’ve got any other option.  It’s about opening up the 
pathways and the communication and liaison between various services in support of each other, really, 
for the best of the client to ensure that pathway is timely and consistent” (Mental Health) 
 
It was felt that individuals in need responded more positively to mental health professionals on-the-ground, 
with their communication skills being critical to positive resolution of specific incidents.  
 
“The majority of them is just talking to them.  Getting them through that crisis of emotional stress at 
that time and giving the tools to keep going, type of thing, until the next day and see your GP and stuff 
like that.  So the majority of it is actually dealt with just by talking and doing like face-to-face therapy 
type stuff, brief intervention, really” (Mental Health) 
 
The value of Operation Alloy was perceived differently by control room staff in comparison to mental health 
staff. For control room staff, the mental health car was often valued as a deployable resource, with an 
articulated link between deployment and resolution of an incident.  
 
“…I’d like to see a bit more, I don't know, resolution involved.  ‘Cause it’s fine giving advice, I must 
admit I’d like to see them out more, deploy more” (Control Room) 
 
“For me, an effective response from the team would be an intervention that saw that being managed 
to the extent that actually it stopped that repeat demand into our force control room” (Control Room) 
 
However, for mental health staff, the true value of Operation Alloy was somewhat more varied. Some staff 
commented how they would deploy to ‘see what they could do’; others saw their value being more beneficial 
in the control room, where they have access to patient records and are able to provide advice to officers on 
scene.  
 
“I have gone out to some cases where I thought, ‘Actually, it’s not really that relevant, but actually I 
can see that you’re struggling with this, so I’ll come and help you.’ And do it as a joint thing.” (Mental 
Health) 
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‘I’ve got access to all my mental health systems.  I’ve got access to the GP records.  I’ve got access to 
the Crisis team, inpatient beds, Acute Liaison service at the General.  I’ve got access to the out of hours 
GP service if I think they might need some meds to hold them overnight with a view to them being seen 
by someone else tomorrow.  I can refer them through to the Community Mental Health teams, the 
outpatients departments.  I can do all of that before I even consider Mental Health Act assessment.’  
(Mental Health) 
 
Whilst being an important feature of the operation, the reported value of the operation was not necessarily 
enabled through deployment, but through the sharing of information and professional judgements of both 
police and mental health staff. The operation resulted in people being dealt with using more appropriate care 
pathways, by conducting a more holistic assessment of an individual’s needs. As part of this, mental health 
professionals described how their judgement differed from police officers, especially in terms of familiarity 
and knowledge of mental health conditions. This was identified to be key when officers, by not understanding 
specific conditions, assessed an individual to be a higher risk in comparison to a lower risk mental health staff 
assessment. As such, a by-product of the operation was a sharing of knowledge about mental health to 
individual officers. Officer’s respective level of engagement and interest did however appear to affect this.    
 
“…it’s about explaining (to Police Officers working on Operation Alloy), “Well, there’s a reason why 
that person behaves in that way. Let’s look at the history. Let’s look at how they form their views of 
themselves and their place in the world.” (Mental Health) 
 
“I think there’s sometimes some frustrations I can see with some particular difficult individuals, which 
isn’t… they don’t really suffer from a true mental illness, as such, like your psychosis, schizophrenia 
type things, but more of a personality disorder, because they’re more difficult to manage.  So 
sometimes some people may present as though they’re hallucinating and shouting and talking, and 
stuff like that, which obviously police on the floor will say, “Oh no, they’re really unwell.”  And then 
once we review it, it’s actually they’re not...  So sometimes it can be a bit frustrating trying to get the 
right pathway for them, for those individuals, ‘cause sometimes they need to be looked at more of the 
police route rather than a mental health route.  But again, it’s down to the case” (Mental Health) 
 
Nevertheless, the analysis suggested that the demand on the control room due to ‘regular callers’ and ‘missing 
persons’ was a continual cause of frustration, with the operation failing to resolve repeat cases. Whilst mental 
health staff did report on-going work with individuals encountered through the operation (demonstrating a 
willingness to develop a longer-term relationship with service users) this was done beyond the bounds of the 
operation. There is therefore perhaps an unreasonable expectation of the capacity of the operation to resolve 
these types of incidents fully; this could instead be the focus of a distinctive and separate partnership between 
police and health care services.  
 
“We’ve got regular callers, so we’ve got regular people who go missing who go to bridges over the M1 
and things like that and threaten to jump off and climb over the barrier and various other things, so 
we’ve got people who go outside and threaten to do things so they’re not contained in an environment.  
I think that happens probably, we could probably say a couple of times a week…” (Control Room) 
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“I do feel sorry for the police, it is a difficult situation… ‘Cause you will always have the same people 
who call in to say the same things, yeah. Yeah, and sometimes the person’s only been assessed in A&E 
an hour ago, but the same situation is replaying because the person hasn’t gained the admission to 
hospital that they feel that they need, obviously. But sometimes it’s about arranging, you know, 
professionals’ meetings and getting a robust risk assessment and plan in place so that there’s a set 
plan for when this situation does occur…” (Mental Health) 
 
“So I came across (description of individual with a condition associated to Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder) and I managed to do some work with [them] (involving specialist technique).  So [they] 
became part of my ongoing caseload.  So it is a good way of finding and targeting people, and trying 
to get them the right help” (Mental Health) 
 
4.2.2 Behaviours and Practices 
 
This section focuses on the behaviours and practices of professionals identified in the analysis both in terms 
of benefits and dis-benefits of the operation. A key benefit recognised in the analysis for officers was an 
increased confidence to respond to mental health needs within emergent incidents - stated to be an increasing 
feature of service demand. This was enabled particularly through the easy access of advice and information 
from mental health professionals. While this provision of information might be seen as a ‘nice-to-have’ 
resource, it was indeed recognised to be potentially the difference between life and death within certain 
incidents. 
 
“I think definitely it’s (Operation Alloy) effective, ‘cause mental health is a massive issue for us, because 
we get limited training on it.  So we’re, you know, sort of… sometimes certainly in situations with a lot 
of people with different personality disorders, bipolar, and having an understanding of how to deal 
with those people, I think it’s quite massive, and that’s where this really helps” (Police Officer)   
 
“So if someone says they’re going to kill themselves, you haven't got that luxury of half an hour to start 
making phone calls…” (Control Room) 
 
A very positive benefit in terms of behaviours of staff involved in the operation was an articulated mutual 
respect for each other’s professional judgement. Mental health staff felt that their contribution was valued 
and respected by the police; police felt consequently relieved and reassured by working with mental health 
professionals. It was felt that consistent staffing enabled stronger relationships to be formed and having better 
outcomes for individuals in need. 
 
“…obviously you strengthen it more if you work with the same people, because their knowledge gets 
stronger.  And there are some officers that are just really, really eager and to learn more about mental 
health… And most officers are brilliant, you know, they’ve got really good communication skills and 
they do care” (Mental Health) 
 
Whilst police officers expressed a respect for the judgements of mental health staff, there was confusion (and 
sometimes tensions) in relation to the decision-making processes of deployment. This was heightened when 
resources were scarce on the ground, and control room staff saw the car/team as a deployable resource. From 
the perspective of police staff, this was interpreted as an issue of ‘willingness’; from the mental health 
perspective, this was an individualistic decision based upon their self-perceived value to the county and to the 
specific incident. That said, there are difficulties in reconciling the threshold at which a deployment should be 
made in relation to the overarching aims of the scheme; this was inconsistently reported by mental health 
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staff. It is recommended that the value and purpose of deployment be clarified and agreed upon by all parties 
involved, in order to minimise potential risk to staff and the public.    
 
“I wouldn't be comfortable coming in and directing a health professional to deploy to a job, put it like 
that, as it sits at the minute.  Because there’s not enough information about what we can and can't 
tell them to do, so yes, that would be helpful, if we got some sort of deployment strategy in place” 
(Control Room) 
 
“For example, when I said earlier about this, trying to get you to go out as a frontline, to go out and 
see somebody that hasn’t been seen… that will often come from the Inspector within the control 
room… So you’re having to sort of almost, you know, have a disagreement with them about that’s not 
appropriate to do that.  And they don’t… because they have their own agenda, sometimes you get that 
clash there” (Mental Health) 
 
“…in the end it’s actually felt like I’ve just been obstinate, but I haven’t because there’s a reason behind 
it, and it’s not appropriate just to go out and cold call somebody. You know, there’s been incidences 
within the team where nurses have been put at risk because it hasn’t been risk assessed” (Mental 
Health) 
 
Police officers articulated respectfully how competent mental health staff were when communicating with 
individuals involved in incidents, striking a balance between empathy and assertiveness in resolving incidents. 
It was recognised how the approach adopted by police officers, informed by their identity and skills, was 
different to that of mental health professionals. One officer in particular was struck by how competent the 
mental health nurse was in speaking, listening and formulating a plan to deal with an individual in need. This 
was felt to lead to a better level of service and higher likelihood of positive outcomes for the respective 
individual. Related to discussion presented in the previous sub-section, however, there were inconsistencies 
that must be acknowledged between mental health professional in terms of deployment, as well as readiness 
to speak to an individual over the telephone.  
 
“The one good thing I’d say about Op. Alloy is if we have had some sort of incident where we don't 
need to go out to them, the nurse have had a chat with them on the phone, they’ve sort of calmed 
them down and they do like a referral to their own sort of GP or whatever it is that they go and see 
sort of on a regular basis” (Control Room) 
 
“… just watching [nurse] in action, [nurse] was very good, [nurse] knew exactly how to talk to the 
[patient].  ‘Cause sometimes we can be a little bit… we have our police hat on, so sometimes we can 
be a little bit different, the approach.  [Nurse] knew exactly how to talk to [patient], where to signpost 
[patient], how to sort of, you know, show [patient] that [nurse] was gonna do something.  ‘Cause 
sometimes when we turn up, you know, we don’t know where to sort of send them.  But [nurse] knew 
exactly what to do, how to say it, what [patient’s] issues were.” (Police Officer) 
 
An important and related issue to this point were lines of accountability and responsibility to such decision-
making. For instance, it is critical to consider who holds responsibility for the shared decision to withdraw 
officers from the scene of an incident (i.e. taking no further action) involving for example suicidal thoughts if 
the individual then went on to commit suicide. This is especially important as this dilemma directly relates to 
the gap in police powers between s135 and s136, an unplanned detention of an individual to a place of safety. 
A more equitable division of responsibilities should be considered, in order to stay true to the ethos of 
partnership working.  
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“And I know it differs from person to person, but I just feel like I’m a bit out of my depth with mental 
health.  I just… I’d rather leave it to the professional that knows what they’re doing and has got the 
time to head over to the Well-in Centre or A&E, or whatever.” (Police Officer)   
 
“I mean, yeah, sometimes I’ll speak to the person on the phone and then advise the officers that they’re 
free to go.  But obviously then we’re carrying a lot of risk ourselves” (Mental Health)  
 
The final point related to behaviours and practices were the implicit messages and meanings of uniform and 
persona. It was recognised that mental health staff were interpreted less confrontationally in comparison to 
police officers by people in need. The florescent jackets and stab vests worn by police officer were viewed as 
both presenting a physical barrier and heightening anxiety within situations. While this was downplayed by 
participants, it did nonetheless have implications for the ease of completing assessments. 
 
“I don’t know, ‘cause I think sometimes this (Stab Vest) is a barrier to people, ‘cause they hate this 
uniform, they hate what it stands for.  I mean, maybe… I don’t know, I think a stab vest, again, would… 
if they turned up wearing that, it might send a message to the person… I don’t think there’s anything 
they could have, ‘cause I think it would just form some sort of barrier” (Police Officer) 
 
“Yeah, sometimes it can be quite difficult when you’ve got… when you go out with a police officer, and 
they’re kind of sort of sat with you, and you’re trying to do an assessment.  That can be quite difficult.  
But to be honest, a few times the police officers just tend to fade into the background and they don’t 
sort of speak and they don’t… they just let you get on with it” (Mental Health) 
 
4.2.3 Management 
 
The aims and expectations of the operation were suggested to have changed over time. This was particularly 
evident in respect to the frequency of deployment, which was understood to have decreased over time, 
reflecting the experiences of other schemes identified in the literature. While reducing s136 detentions was 
identified as being the original aim, other objectives may be held by individuals and the respective 
organisations in relation to service quality, longer term resolution and reduction of ‘regular callers’. These 
inconsistencies in terms of expectations (re. practices and deployment) and purpose for individuals involved 
in the operation may contribute to the identified inconsistencies between staff in terms of their practice and 
behaviours. This consequentially led to a growing tension and frustration held by a minority of individuals.  
 
“So I’ve asked someone (mental health professional) before to say, oh could you just give them a phone 
call just to, you know, have a chat with them over the phone?  And [they] said no.  But I know they can 
do it because all the other ones do it.  But I can't say, well everyone else does it and you're not… My 
understanding was that they could just do it.  [They] told me that they couldn't, so I don't know.  
Whether the other ones are doing it wrong and they’re not allowed to and they’re just making phone 
calls or whether [they’ve] just not been told that [they] can or, I don't know” (Control Room) 
 
“I have gone out to some cases where I thought, “Actually, it’s not really that relevant, but actually I 
can see that you’re struggling with this, so I’ll come and help you.” And do it as a joint thing” (Mental 
Health) 
 
Broader guidelines and principles were suggested to be welcomed by all parties to guide practice during shifts 
on the operation. It was felt this would help to deliver a greater degree of continuity between shifts and staff, 
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and therefore provide a more equitable experience for the partnership between the police and mental health. 
Moreover, such an agreement would help to reconfigure the reputation (and the implicit expectations) of the 
operation, better reflecting the realities of how and why the operation works. 
 
“There needs to be more coordination and kind of organisation, I suppose, of the role and what it 
should be.  We need to all know that we’re responding in the same way, really.  ‘Cause it’s not fair if I 
say, “Yes, I’ll go to that job”, but somebody else says, “No, I’m not doing that job.”  ‘Cause then we’ve 
lost that consistency.  So I think maybe we need clearer guidelines about…  Imagine that’s easy to say, 
‘cause it is a judgement call, and everything’s so different” (Mental Health) 
 
“…I’ve rarely seen them go out, which I was surprised about.  I thought there would be a lot more 
driving round actually face-to-face stuff going on with people, just to maybe stop more phone calls 
coming into us or whatever, but there’s a lot of sort of computer work goes on in here and you see 
them all tapping away and having conversations” (Control Room)  
 
In particular, better communication about the operation to frontline officers would support how the operation 
is perceived and valued within IRTs, with current briefing information not being fully read and interpreted by 
some. Indeed, some response officers felt that they are letting their IRT down (e.g. exposing their colleagues 
to a greater degree of risk) when deployed to Operation Alloy, rather than adding wider, systemic value. This 
has consequential implications for staff assigned to the operation in terms of motivation and self-perceived 
value.  
 
“But I guess it’s just one of those things, we’re dragging Response staff away from doing Response.  
There’s not enough staff anyway to be on Response, let alone pulling them off to do a mental health 
triage car.  It’s not for the want of the officers, ‘cause it’s quite nice to do something a bit different, but 
just Northants Police, we haven’t got the officers on the frontline…” (Police Officer) 
 
A key issue affecting the operational performance of the operation were the staffing arrangements. It was 
strongly indicated that more consistent staffing arrangements would be welcomed as it was recognised that 
staffing of the operation was irregular, from both police and mental health perspectives, affecting continuity. 
For police, it was felt that officers pulled from their IRT to the operation were not backfilled, thus taking their 
team below minimum cover. From the mental health perspective, it was indicated that, more recently, ‘bank 
staff’ were increasingly assigned to the operation. 
 
“…on the Friday, you find out these officers are going on Op Alloy you think, “Well, hang on, we’re 
covering the town centre.  There’s mass public disorder.  Violence, drunks.  You can’t reason with 
people.  But yet they’re taking our staff off us.”  I personally resented that, because I thought, “Well, 
hang on, that’s not fair on us.  Can these resources come from somewhere else?” (Police Officer) 
 
“It can be hit and miss… But I know there are a good number of nights where we’ve had a notification 
come through to say you don't have a mental health professional tonight or the cop’s gone sick, so 
literally the mental health professional will just sit here on her own and if she needs to liaise with one 
of the guys out there for any police intel, but in terms of then its effectiveness as a unit to be able to 
respond if it chooses to do so is immediately eradicated.” (Control Room) 
 
The inconsistent arrangements to staff the operation, alongside the poor articulation of expectations in the 
form of briefings, has resulted in a reduced utilisation of time. This was expressed by police officers in 
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particular in not know what to do or how to add value within the control room during quiet periods. Equally 
this was the case during incidents when an assessment was being completed.  
 
“If I didn’t have [CPD] work to do, ‘cause I’d no crimes at the time, I would have just sat on the Daily 
Mail for the entire evening… Because I wasn’t told to do anything else.  It wasn’t even a case of like, 
“What can I do?”  Because I was under the idea of, they’ll tell you if there’s a job, there’s nothing else 
for you to do” (Police Officer) 
 
“I felt a bit like when she was dealing with it, and the family were there, and they were kind of thing… 
and they said to me, “Well, why are you here for?”  And I said, “Well, basically I’m the driver and the 
minder.”” (Police Officer) 
 
It was stated that the operation historically had a more regular pool of individuals who worked on the shift. 
On the one hand, the operation would benefit from having closer relationships being formed within the team 
with the potential to lead to more efficient practice, while on the other hand, the added benefit for staff in 
terms of increased knowledge between the organisations would be more isolated to a core set of individuals.  
 
“…when this system was first set up, there was lots and lots of nurses who expressed an interest, and 
there was lots of people sat round that table initially.  But as people realise it’s maybe not always as 
exciting as what you think, or it’s more tiring than what you expect, then the numbers dwindle, so 
there’s only quite a small handful of us left” (Mental Health)   
 
“I think it’d be helpful if there was… Because they understand, and then they’ll understand what’s 
expected of them.  They’ll have a genuine interest in mental health and in making the car successful.  
And you get to know them, so you’d have a better working relationship with them as opposed to 
somebody… you can have an officer with you and then you may never see them again.  And they don’t 
really know.  They come on, they don’t know what’s expected of them.  They don’t know what the real 
purpose of it is, you know.  They’ve just kind of heard from other people.  You know, I’ve had officers 
come in with sort of just paperwork, past paperwork that that’s what they’re planning on doing, is just 
sitting and doing their paperwork all evening” (Mental Health) 
 
The mechanisms to identify measurable impact were suggested to be inefficient and tiring, explaining gaps in 
the data presented in Section 4.1. The current arrangements also meant that mental health nurses were 
required to provide data twice, which was viewed negatively.  
 
“…well that’s just a paper form.  But that’s basically just copying down the name, the incident number, 
the date of birth, and everything that’s already on the system.  So I think it’d be more better use of 
time if we just left a… emailed the admin lady, for instance, or the team leader, to say, “I saw this 
person last night.”… Just seems a bit of a round the houses…” (Mental Health) 
 
The inaccuracies in documenting the activities of the operation possibly contributes to the lack of 
communication from the operation about its impact and value. The extent to which the operation was able to 
demonstrate measurable impact based on its reporting procedures was limited, having implications for 
engaging response officers, and also informing perspectives within the wider organisations.  
 
“Don’t really get briefed as such. There’s been quite a lot of changes.  Obviously there was a custody 
lead nurse, but now the role is being covered by two members of staff.  We used to have meetings 
when it was first set up.  I think it was every month… but the custody staff would be there because 
obviously it was part of their role to cover that.  But they seem to have petered off really because I 
think lack of resources, lack of people” (Mental Health)  
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5. Discussion and Recommendations 
 
The findings demonstrate how the operation was viewed positively, particularly by control room staff and 
mental health professionals. The operation was indicated to be worthwhile and valuable, especially at 
facilitating a wider range of disposals for individuals in need, and responded to by the police. There were, 
however, a range of problematic issues which, if addressed, would allow the operation to improve in terms of 
efficiency, effectiveness and reputation.  
 
The following points identify key findings and recommendations to address each point made. 
 
1. The operation was suggested to have evolved over time, with individual staff holding different 
understandings of their operational expectations and perceived value. 
 
R1. The operation has a refresh, with all objectives as well as the purpose/identity of the 
operation being explicitly communicated to all parties. 
 
2. The data recording for the purpose of adequately capturing the activities of the operation held by the 
police was found to be inaccurate, thus not allowing a comprehensive evidencing of actions, value or 
outcomes. 
 
R2. The data recording procedures are reviewed and streamlined. As part of this, clear 
expectations and accountabilities for all parties in terms of documentation are formulated. 
 
3. The irregular staffing arrangements were suggested to contribute to inconsistencies identified during the 
completion of this project, being consequential to perceptions held by different individuals, and potentially 
resulting in inconsistent levels of service delivery to people in need. 
 
R3. A dedicated and bespoke team is assigned regularly to the operation, with the respective 
composition of such a team being re-considered, and different roles potentially introduced (e.g. 
PCSOs, specials, paramedics etc.). 
 
4. The evidence shows inconsistencies between staff in terms of activities completed during shifts, and the 
thresholds or factors involved in deployment decision-making. 
 
R4. The staff involved in the operation are afforded opportunities to share learning and good 
practice, enabling more consistent responses to, and resolution of, emergent incidents. Such 
learning opportunities should be monitored and appropriate amendments to governance and 
practice documentation made.  
 
5. The progress and achievements of the operation were found to not be captured or meaningfully 
recognised. 
 
R5. A quarterly partnership management meeting is held to review progress, in relation to agreed 
objectives (R1). 
 
R6. A communication strategy is developed to disseminate operational effectiveness both in terms 
of inward value (resource vs. outcome, frequency of s136 reduction/avoidance) and outward 
value (longer term resolution for the individual in need).  
 
R7. Appropriate succession planning is undertaken to ensure practices and management of 
operation is not held by any one individual, and is transferred when individuals move into 
different postings.   
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